properties of the environment, describing the tasks that perceptual systems are trying to perform, and deriving appropriate computational theories of how to perform those tasks ' (Geisler and Kersten, 2002, 508 Perceptual processes are subpersonal and inaccessible to the thinker. There is no good sense in which the thinker herself, as opposed to her perceptual system, executes perceptual inferences. For instance, a normal perceiver simply sees a surface as having a certain colour.
Perceptual constancies are capacities to represent properties or entities as the same despite large variation in proximal stimulation. To varying degrees, human vision displays constancies for numerous properties, including size, shape, location, colour, depth, and motion.
How does the perceptual system achieve constancies? By using 'implicit assumptions' to discount variations in proximal stimulation. Colour constancy provides a good illustration. This is the capacity to perceive surface colour as constant despite large variation in viewing conditions, including background illumination. To estimate surface colour, the perceptual system first deploys various 'implicit assumptions' (such as that the light source is fairly uniform, or that certain surface colours are likelier than others) to estimate background illumination based upon overall retinal stimulation. The perceptual system then deploys this background illumination estimate so as to estimate a surface's colour based upon retinal stimulation caused by that surface. As Helmholtz famously put it, the perceptual system 'discounts the illuminant'.
Perceptual constancies are reliable but fallible, as demonstrated by illusions. Consider again the assumption that light comes from overhead. The assumption is correct in normal cases, so it usually supports an inference to an accurate percept. When the assumption fails, the resulting percept is inaccurate. For instance, lighting a concave object from below generates an illusory percept as of a convex object. Constructivists explain the mistaken shape-estimate by isolating its source: the implicit assumption that light comes from overhead. Similarly, a red spotlight directed upon a single object violates the implicit assumption of a fairly uniform illuminant, thereby inducing an illusory colour percept. These examples illustrate constructivism's template for explaining illusions: isolate an implicit assumption deployed Perceptual processes are subpersonal and inaccessible to the thinker. There is no good sense in which the thinker herself, as opposed to her perceptual system, executes perceptual inferences. For instance, a normal perceiver simply sees a surface as having a certain colour.
Even if she notices the light spectrum reaching her eye, as a painter might, she cannot access the perceptual system's inference from retinal stimulations to surface colour. 2 The twentieth century produced various rivals to constructivism, including Gibson's direct perception framework. Gibson (1979) denied that perception involves complex psychological activity, inferential or otherwise. He held that the perceptual system directly 'picks up' certain distal properties by 'resonating' to them. Gibson's work yielded many invaluable insights, such as the importance of optic flow, which can be incorporated into constructivism.
Viewed as an alternative to constructivism, Gibson's direct perception framework has difficulty explaining the vast bulk of constancies and illusions (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981) . That is why the direct perception framework remains marginal within perceptual psychology.
A satisfactory development of constructivism must answer three questions:
a. In what sense does the perceptual system execute 'inferences'?
b. In what sense do the inferences 'reflect' various 'implicit assumptions '? c. In what sense does perceptual inference yield the 'best' hypothesis? Different versions of constructivism answer these questions differently. For instance, some constructivists regard 'implicit assumptions' as stored premises fit to participate in unconscious deductive, inductive, or abductive inferences (Rock, 1983, 272-282) . Bayesian perceptual psychology develops constructivism in a different direction, as I will now explain. a. Ambiguity of sensory input, as described above.
b. Noisiness of perceptual organs and neural mechanisms: that is, their vulnerability to corruption by random errors.
c. Potential conflict between sensory modalities (e.g. visual versus auditory cues to an object's location) or between cues within a modality (e.g. binocular disparity cues to depth versus monocular linear perspective cues to depth).
It therefore seems natural to formalize constructivism through Bayesian decision theory, which models decision-making under uncertainty.
The core notion underlying Bayesian decision theory is subjective probability. Subjective probabilities reflect psychological facets of the individual or her subsystems, rather than 'objective' features of reality. To formalize probabilities, we introduce a hypothesis space H containing various hypotheses h. Each hypothesis h reflects a possible state of the world (e.g. a possible shape of some distal object; or a possible colour of some distal surface; or a possible assignment of distal objects to spatial locations). A probability function p maps each hypothesis h to a real number p(h), reflecting the agent's subjective probabilities. One then normalizes so that all probabilities sum to 1. Finally, one adopts the resulting posterior probability p(h | e) as a revised probability assignment for h. Thus, the new probability of h is proportional to its original probability, multiplied by the likelihood of evidence e given h.
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Bayesian perceptual psychologists use this framework to model perceptual inference (Knill and Richards, 1996) . On a Bayesian approach, the perceptual system entertains hypotheses drawn from a hypothesis space H. The perceptual system assigns prior probabilities to hypotheses h and prior likelihoods to (e, h) pairs, where each e corresponds to some possible sensory input. After receiving input e, the perceptual system reallocates probabilities across the hypothesis space, in rough accord with Bayes's Rule.
To illustrate, consider the extraction of shape from shading (Mamassian, Landy, and Maloney, 2002) . Let s reflect possible shapes, θ reflect possible lighting directions, and e reflect possible patterns of retinal illumination. The visual system encodes:
A prior probability p(s), which assigns higher probability to certain distal shapes than others (e.g. it may assign higher probability to convex shapes).
A prior probability p(θ), which assigns higher probability to an overhead lighting direction than to alternative lighting directions.
A prior likelihood p(e | s, θ), which assigns a higher probability to an (e, s, θ) triplet if distal shape s and lighting direction θ are likely to cause retinal illumination e.
Upon receiving retinal illumination e, the perceptual system redistributes probabilities over shape-estimates, yielding a posterior p(s | e). Depending on the case, the posterior might assign a much higher probability to convexity than concavity. For details, see Stone (2011) .
Perception normally yields a determinate percept. For instance, one sees an object as having a determinate shape, not a spectrum of more or less probable shapes. Accordingly, Bayesian models explain how the perceptual system selects a single hypothesis h based on the posterior p(h | e). Typical models invoke expected utility maximization. The 'action' is selection of h. The utility function, which is task-dependent, reflects the penalty for an incorrect answer. If the utility function has a suitable shape, then expected utility maximization reduces to a much simpler decision rule, such as selecting the mean or the mode of the posterior probability.
As another example, Bayesian models of surface colour perception proceed roughly as follows. A surface has reflectance R(λ), specifying the fraction of incident light that the surface reflects at each wavelength λ. 5 The illuminant has spectral power distribution I(λ): the light power at each wavelength. The retina receives light spectrum C(λ) = I(λ) R(λ) from the surface.
The visual system seeks to estimate surface reflectance R(λ). This estimation problem is underdetermined, since C(λ) is consistent with numerous I(λ)-R(λ) pairs. Typical Bayesian models posit that two surfaces have the same colour appearance for a perceiver when her perceptual system estimates the same reflectance for each surface. To estimate R(λ), the visual system estimates I(λ). It does so through a Bayesian inference, based upon overall retinal stimulation, that deploys a prior probability over possible illuminants and possible surface reflectances. To a first approximation, the illuminant prior assigns higher probability to illuminants that resemble natural daylight, while the surface prior assigns higher probability to surface reflectances that occur more commonly in the natural environment. This framework can 9 9 explain both the success and the failure of human colour constancy under various conditions. For details, see Brainard (2009). 6 We can schematize a typical Bayesian model through the template depicted in Figure 1 . Most Bayesian models conform roughly to the foregoing template. But some models vary the template. For instance, some models augment the template by incorporating motor efference copy. 8 Other models replace expected utility maximization with probability matching, a nondeterministic process whereby the probability that the perceptual system selects some hypothesis matches the posterior probability assigned to that hypothesis (Mamassian, Landy, and Maloney, 2002) . One phenomenon sometimes analyzed through non-deterministic Bayesian modelling is multistable perception (such as the Necker cube). During multistable perception, experience fluctuates between distinct percepts, rather than yielding a unique percept.
One can construe Bayesian models of perception in two different ways (Kersten and Mamassian, 2009 c. The perceptual system produces an estimate that is 'best' or 'optimal' insofar as it conforms to rational norms of Bayesian decision theory. In this manner, Bayesian models depict numerous perceptual illusions as natural by-products of a nearoptimal process that infers environmental conditions from ambiguous sensory stimulations.
Hence, the Bayesian framework converts talk about 'implicit assumptions' and 'unconscious inferences' into mathematically rigorous, quantitatively precise psychological models.
Where do the prior probabilities and prior likelihoods come from? The human visual system evolved over millennia in a fairly stable environment. Accordingly, one might expect certain lawlike or statistical environmental regularities to be 'encoded in the genes'.
Nevertheless, Bayesian perceptual priors do not simply reflect innate programming. For instance, even the 'light-from-overhead' prior reflects a complex interplay between nature and nurture. It gathers considerable strength during early childhood (Stone, 2011) , and it changes rapidly upon adult exposure to deviant environments (Adams, Graf, and Ernst, 2004) . At present, we do not know how genetic endowment and individual experience jointly determine Bayesian priors.
Current research mainly tries to identify the priors, not to explain the etiology of the priors. Ultimately, we want detailed theories explaining how Bayesian priors originate and develop. Even lacking such theories, we can cite the priors to explain constancies and illusions.
In this connection, I stress that the priors postulated by Bayesian perceptual psychology are not ad hoc. Admittedly, a precise quantitative match usually requires some 'curve fitting'.
Qualitatively, though, the priors typically reflect antecedently motivated claims about lawlike or statistical properties of our environment. It is plausible that the perceptual system acquires these priors through some combination of nature and nurture, even if we do not yet know how. The prior probability favours slow distal motions.
The visual system treats low-contrast retinal images as less reliable. Bayesian approach to motion perception in increasingly sophisticated ways (Ernst, 2010) .
Bayesian perceptual psychology offers illuminating, rigorous explanations for numerous constancies and illusions. It is our best current science of perception. We should carefully consider how it bears upon contemporary philosophy of mind-a task to which I now turn. Burge (2005 Burge ( , 2010 Burge ( , 2011 argues that current perceptual psychology supports representationalism. I will now defend the same conclusion by examining Bayesian models of perception.
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On the Bayesian approach, perceptual inference reallocates probabilities over a hypothesis space and then selects a favoured hypothesis. This favoured hypothesis is incorporated into the final percept, whose accuracy depends upon whether the hypothesis is accurate. To illustrate, consider Bayesian models of shape perception. The perceptual system assigns prior probabilities to estimates of specific distal shapes. After receiving sensory input, perceptual inference revises the probability assignment and selects a favoured estimate of a specific distal shape. The resulting percept incorporates this favoured shape-estimate. The percept may also incorporate various size-estimates, motion-estimates, and so on. Accuracy of the percept depends upon accuracy of the individual estimates. By describing perceptual inference in this way, we type-identify perceptual states representationally. We individuate perceptual states partly through environmental conditions that must obtain for the states to be accurate.
What exactly are the accuracy-conditions of percepts? According to Davies (1992) The relational view of perception Brewer (2007 ), Campbell (2010 , Martin (2004) , and Travis (2004) espouse a relational view of perception. Relationalists eschew all talk about perceptual representation. They treat perceptual states as relations not to representational contents but rather to objects or properties in the perceived environment. For instance, Campbell (2010, 202) holds that 'the content of visual experience is constituted by the objects and properties in the scene perceived', rather than by anything resembling an accuracy-condition. He cautions that we should not 'think of experience itself as already a representational state' (ibid.). The relational approach is sometimes allied with Gibsonian direct perception, sometimes not.
To illustrate, consider two counterfactual situations A and B in which I perceive the same object O, yielding qualitatively indistinguishable percepts P A and P B :
In situation A, O is convex and looks convex.
In situation B, O is concave but looks convex through misleading lighting.
Representational taxonomization type-identifies P A and P B by correlating them with the same accuracy-condition. In particular, both percepts estimate the same distal shape: convexity. In situation A, the estimate is correct. In situation B, the estimate is incorrect. By contrast, 16 16 Campbell's relational taxonomization treats P A and P B as type-distinct. Campbell type-identifies the first percept through its relation to a distal property (convexity) to which the second percept is not appropriately related.
Bayesian perceptual psychology supports representationalism over relationalism.
A core postulate underlying the science is that perception produces an estimate of environmental conditions, where the estimate may be either accurate or inaccurate. Consider Figure 1 . If we neglect noise, malfunction, and external interference, then a unique percept-type is determined by four factors: the prior probability, the prior likelihood, proximal sensory input, and the utility function. We may stipulate that all four factors are the same in situations A and B.
It follows that percepts P A and P B are type-identical from the perspective of the Bayesian model.
In both cases, the final percept incorporates a convexity-estimate. The perceptual system produces a convexity-estimate whether or not the perceived object is convex. (Cf. Burge, 2005, 22-25; 2010, 362-364.) An appropriately modified diagnosis applies to non-deterministic
Bayesian models, such as models that replace expected utility maximization with probability matching. For such models, the probability that situation A yields a convexity-estimate equals the probability that situation B yields a convexity-estimate. Thus, explanatory generalizations of Bayesian perceptual psychology enshrine a representational, non-relational taxonomic scheme.
The generalizations type-identify percepts by specifying environmental conditions that must obtain for a given percept to be accurate.
Campbell (2010) Brewer's account omits crucial scientifically relevant commonalities between the two percepts. A key scientifically relevant commonality is that both percepts result from perceptual estimation of a single surface reflectance R(λ). The estimate is correct in (i), incorrect in (ii). We Beginning with Quine (1960) , various philosophers have argued that intentionality (or representationality) deserves no place in serious scientific discourse. They have argued that we should replace intentional psychology with some alternative framework, such as Skinnerian behaviourism (Quine, 1960) or neuroscience (Churchland, 1981 properties. To illustrate, let us follow Thompson (2010) by considering phenomenological twins embedded in such different environments that one twin's percept P represents circularity while the other twin's qualitatively indistinguishable percept P* represents non-circular ellipticality.
There may be many worthy explanatory projects that type-identify P and P*. But Bayesian perceptual psychology does not type-identify the two percepts. The science studies perceptual estimation of environmental conditions. P and P* estimate radically different environmental conditions: P estimates circularity, while P* estimates non-circular ellipticality. The science features no explanatory generalizations that assimilate these two percepts, because the relevant generalizations are tailored to specific shapes. Phenomenological overlap per se is irrelevant to the current science. What matters is representational overlap.
Similarly, suppose that Nonvert observes a red object, while spectrally inverted Invert Current perceptual psychology individuates perceptual states by citing representational relations to specific environmental properties. 18 Taxonomization through phenomenal content ignores these representational relations. I conclude that phenomenal content is an armchair construct with no grounding inside contemporary science. Readers must judge for themselves whether philosophical energy is better expended studying this armchair construct or analyzing our current best science of perception.
The computational theory of mind I now want to consider the relation between Bayesian perceptual psychology and the popular philosophical view that mental activity involves computation over formal syntactic types in a language of thought (Field, 2001) , (Fodor, 2008) , (Stich, 1983) . The paradigm here is a Turing machine manipulating formal syntactic items, such as stroke marks, inscribed in memory Field (2001) and Stich (1983) combine the formal syntactic picture with eliminativism.
They urge scientific psychology to eschew any talk about representational content. Fodor (2008) combines the formal syntactic picture with intentional realism. In particular, he urges scientific psychology to delineate causal laws that cite representational content. He holds that intentional Egan (1992) argues that perceptual psychology postulates formal syntactic manipulation.
She defends her conclusion by analyzing the writings of Marr (1982) . I set aside whether Egan correctly describes Marr's work, which was historically important but is now outdated. 19 I claim that the formal syntactic picture finds no support within current perceptual psychology, as epitomized by Bayesian modelling. Current perceptual psychology individuates mental computations in representational rather than formal syntactic terms (Burge, 2010, 95-101) . For instance, Bayesian models of shape perception describe a computation whereby the visual system reallocates probabilities over hypotheses about distal shape. Each hypothesis is individuated partly by its representational relation to a specific distal shape. Transition rules governing the computation derive from Bayesian norms. Of course, the transition rules characterize initial sensory inputs (such as retinal inputs) physiologically rather than representationally. Crucially, though, the rules use representational vocabulary to characterize the perceptual states caused by initial sensory inputs. The rules do not cite formal syntax when characterizing sensory inputs (which are described physiologically) or ensuing perceptual states (which are described representationally). Bayesian models do not cite formal syntactic items divested of representational import.
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A complete science of perception must illuminate the neural mechanisms that implement Bayesian computation. 21 Thus, a complete theory should include non-representational neural descriptions. But should it include non-representational syntactic descriptions? Syntax is supposed to be multiply realizable, in the sense that systems with wildly different intrinsic physical constitutions can satisfy the same syntactic description (Fodor, 2008, 91) . Systems may A common rejoinder is that we can reinterpret intentional explanations in formal syntactic terms, without explanatory loss. In this vein, Field (2001, 72-82, 153-156) Bayesian models while retaining the explanatory benefits provided by those models.
In her later writings, Egan (2010) avoids talk about formal syntactic manipulation.
Instead, she claims that computational models of perception offer "abstract mathematical descriptions" that ignore representational properties of perceptual states. This new account shares a crucial feature with the formal syntactic picture. Both accounts prioritize non-intentional, nonneural computational descriptions. As I have argued, no such descriptions figure in Bayesian perceptual psychology.
Philosophers motivate non-intentional computational modelling through various arguments. One popular argument emphasizes explanatory generality (Egan, 2010) , (Stich, 1983, 160-170 An abstract mathematical description?
To bolster my assessment, I will now examine more carefully the role that probability theory plays within Bayesian modelling. Interested readers can consult any standard probability-theory textbook for the technical background to my discussion.
Probability theory, as axiomatized by Kolmogorov, posits a sample space Ω whose elements are possible 'outcomes'. Kolmogorov's axioms place no restrictions on elements of Ω.
If Ω is discrete, then we can assign probabilities directly to its elements. If Ω is continuous, then we instead assign probabilities to privileged subsets of Ω. We introduce a -algebra over Ω (i.e. a set of subsets of Ω that contains Ω and is closed under countable union and complementation in Ω). A probability measure assigns a probability (a real number) to each element of the -algebra.
A random variable is a measurable function from Ω to the real numbers ℝ. 24 A probability measure and a random variable jointly induce a probability distribution: an assignment of probabilities to privileged subsets of ℝ. Intuitively, the random variable lets us transform a probability assignment involving Ω into a probability assignment involving ℝ. 25 The probability distribution exists entirely within the realm of abstract mathematical entities. By citing the random variable and the probability distribution, we vastly increase the elegance and 29 29 utility of our mathematical formalism. In particular, we can now apply real analysis to probabilistic modelling.
When Ω is continuous, we can often introduce a probability density function (pdf), which carries each element of ℝ to a probability density (also drawn from ℝ). A famous example is the Normal (or Gaussian) distribution, whose associated probability density function is depicted in Figure 2 .
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The probability that a random variable attains a value within some region is found by integrating the pdf over that region. In other words, the probability assigned by the probability distribution to a region equals the integral of the pdf over that region. 26 A pdf is a purely mathematical entity, just like a probability distribution.
To apply probability theory to psychological modelling, we must specify the nature of the underlying sample space Ω. In practice, Bayesian perceptual psychologists rarely highlight the underlying sample space Ω. Typical models, including all the models described in this paper, instead emphasize probability distributions or pdfs. For instance, Jacobs (1999) posits a pdf defined over a random variable corresponding to depth. A pdf is a purely mathematical entity. By specifying it, we do not specify a unique sample space Ω. The pdf is consistent with numerous sample spaces.
At first blush, the scientific emphasis on probability distributions and pdfs may seem to As evidence for my position, I cite alternative measurement units. Our mapping from depth-estimates to real numbers depends upon our choice of units. The metric system yields one random variable. The British imperial system yields another. Our choice of random variable reflects our measurement units. Thus, the specific mathematical parameters enshrined by a random variable are mere artefacts of our measurement system. The parameters lack any explanatory significance for scientific psychology. We may use metric units to measure depth, but the perceptual system almost certainly does not. Psychological significance resides in the state estimate, not the mathematical entities through which we parameterize state estimates. Our ultimate concern is the probability measure over environmental state estimates, not the probability distribution over mathematical parameters. To privilege the latter over the former is to read our own idiosyncratic measurement system into the psychological phenomena. We must 32 32 not conflate our measurement units with the environmental states that we use the units to measure.
I conclude that Bayesian perceptual psychology offers intentional generalizations governing probability assignments to environmental state estimates. We articulate the generalizations by citing probability distributions and pdfs over mathematical entities. But these purely mathematical functions are artefacts of our measurement units. They reflect our idiosyncratic measurement conventions, not the underlying psychological reality. They do not yield any explanatorily significant level of non-representational psychological description. They are tools for describing how the perceptual system allocates probabilities over a hypothesis space whose elements are individuated representationally. A Bayesian perceptual model has an abstract mathematical form, but this form does not secure explanatorily significant non-representational descriptions of perceptual states.
What if we identify the privileged measurement units used by the perceptual system?
Can't we assign explanatory priority to a pdf defined over those units? And won't the resulting theory be non-representational?
One problem with this suggestion is that the perceptual system may not employ measurement units. In Peacocke's (1992) terminology, perceptual representation may be 'unitfree'. As far as we know, for example, the visual system may form a depth-estimate without denominating that estimate in feet, metres, or any other measurement units (although we use units to describe the estimate's accuracy-condition). Admittedly, we may eventually discover that the perceptual system employs measurement units. It is difficult to anticipate how such a discovery might impact perceptual psychology. At present, the matter is speculative. All we can say for sure is that current Bayesian models do not attribute measurement units to the perceptual Philosophers who pursue these questions will discover an imposing scientific literature that rewards intensive foundational analysis.
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